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Abstract  
Reference of jurisprudential texts to religion brings to mind the religious right and the obligation 
to resemble with divisions of law in France. In the legal system of Islam, dhimmah (treaty or obligation) 
have been extensively used along ages and in different fields. On the contrary, in the classical law and 
French law, the title "Patrimoine" (asset or property) is used throughout the commitments. In the religious 
law, a person who is called a creditor or promisee has direct rights over another person who is called 
debtor or promisor. Since debt is directly related to individuals’ obligations, so to identify exact meaning 
and concept of religious or individual right, it is necessary to examine its execution which is the very 
dhimmah in jurisprudence or the property and obligation mentioned by Arab and French lawyers. In spite 
of the similarities between these two terms, there is no comparable capability between the dhimmah and 
the asset; for the term dhimma is not compatible with the term "Patrimoine" (asset); hence, in this article, 
these two terms are to be conceptualized and compared. 
 
Keywords: Dhimmah (obligation); Property; Religious Right; liability 
 
 
1- Introduction 
 
The jurists have spoken of dhimma (treaty or obligation) in various chapters, including worship, 
rulings, law, contracts and unilateral legal acts. In case there is a single obligation, dhimma is executed in 
the general sense, but if it is a religious obligation, dhimma is executed in a special sense that is 
accompanied by a guarantee. Thus, separating the original from debt in jurisprudence is based on the 
theory of dhimma, meaning that the basis of this distinction is belonging or non-belonging to dhimma 
(Sanhouri, 1988, 1: 20). Therefore, the subject of discussion in this study is dhimma in a special sense, i.e. 
the financial dhimma. The concept of dhimma in Islamic law with the property (Patrimoine) in French law 
has an effective role in identifying religious or personal rights. So in the common sense, dhimma as a 
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credit container in which a person's rights and duties accumulate is very similar to the concept of property 
and both terms are considered as one of the subsets of the issue of obligations (liabilities). Therefore, 
dhimma with terms such as commitment, undertaking, capacity, etc., is closely related, but it does not 
have the same application, so that the existence of dhimma precedes all of them. The origin of the 
confrontation between dhimma and property is in Arabic law which imitates French law and uses property 
instead of dhimma. Hence, the jurists have used these two terms together with the same meaning. Here 
hence some questions arise such as “what is dhimma?”, “Is dhimma the same as terms such as obligation, 
liability, capacity, etc.?” “Is the term dhimma opposes to ‘Patrimoine’?”. Such questions are intended to 
be answered in the present paper. In the process, firstly the concept of dhimma and its features are 
discussed, and secondly the term property/asset and its features are studied in French law. After getting 
acquainted with these titles, as jurisprudential and French data are important to recognize religious rights, 
in the third section, a comparison between dhimma and asset would be done. 
 
2- Dhimma 
 
The content of dhimma is examined in three parts: a) generalities about the concept of dhimma, b) 
difference between dhimma and similar concepts and c) its features according to Islamic law. 
 
2-1. The concept of dhimma 
Dhimma in the general sense includes all the requirements and obligations, and in a special sense, 
belongs to the owner whenever he/she is engaged in a property (Bojnordi and Moqtadayi, 2013, 2: 139). 
Dhimma terminologically means covenant, guarantee, trust, etc. (Ibn Manẓūr, 2004, 6: 43). That is why 
an infidel who has a pact with the Islamic government is called a dhimmi (protected) infidel. Dhimma also 
means guarantee (diman). It is in this usage that when someone says, ‘some money is in my dhimma to 
someone else’, this means that he is the guarantor of the same amount for him/her. But it is often used in 
the sense of covenant and obligation, as it is common to say that this right is in my dhimma, meaning to 
be up to someone (Ibn Abi Al-Ḥadīd, 1378, 1: 273 and Tabatabaei Boroujerdi, 1399, 4: 211). As stated in 
the Qur’an in the sense of covenant1 (Allamah Tabatabaei, 1417 AH, 9: 196). In a hadith of Amir al-
Mu'minin, dhimma is also conveyed to guaranty and liability2 (Ibn Manẓūr, 2004, 12: 221). 
There is disagreement about the technical concept of the term dhimma. According to some, 
dhimma is a description in a person, according to which a person is qualified to have a right for or against 
him. Even the appearance of the words of some popular jurists, such as Abu Zayd, shows that dhimma is 
the same as aql (reason/wisdom) (Khouri Shirtouni, 1403: 373). In this case, it is not the essence but 
mainly is a description for individuals. On the other hand, some others have given intrinsic value to 
dhimma. Fakhr al-Islam, a Sunni scholar, writes: “Every human being who is born has dhimma and that is 
the dhimma of authority which has the right and duty (Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 1404 
AH, 21: 274). As seen, in the first interpretation, the dhimma is a single description, but in the second, it 
is something/someone to that the qualification of right and duty is added. It is clear that in the intrinsic 
sense, the object is capable of a description. In the common sense, dhimma is a vessel of credit that is 
assumed in a person and in which a person's rights and duties are accumulated. In this application, there 
are many similarities between the property and the concept of "Patrimoine" (property), which is 
mentioned in French classical law. According to common view, dhimma is only a container of 
generalities, not a container of personal and concrete standing properties. In other words, the rights related 
to the property itself do not belong to individuals’ dhimma, but debts that are general matters, belong to 
dhimma (Jafari Langaroudi, 2003: 120). According to this view that is sometimes erroneously attributed 
                                                          
1. See Q, 9: 8-10. 
2.میعَز ِِهب ََاَنا َو َةنیهَر ُلُوَقا اِمب یت َّمِذ . 
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding (IJMMU) Vol. 7, No. 7, August 2020 
 
Comparison of Dhimmah and Asset in French Jurisprudence and Law 131 
 
to all jurists, the debt is supposed for a person’s liability when a place for its existence in man is 
imagined, and this hypothetical place is the very dhimma. However, it should be noted that in Islamic law, 
dhimma is never assigned to property, rather it belongs to all announced rights and duties. Contrary to 
common view that dhimma is considered exclusively by the general properties or general affairs, both 
among the Hanbalis and the Imami jurists, some believe that sometimes the place of dhimma or 
commitment to dhimma is the general standing property and sometimes the personal and concrete 
standing property. They divide the personal standing properties that may be belonged to dhimma, into 
two: 
 
A) In the case of guaranteed standing properties, such as the usurped property that the usurper is obliged 
to give back, the usurper is said to be in dhimma (mashqhoul al-dhimma) as well. 
B) As for non-guaranteed properties, like commitment of the trustee to give back the trust properties to 
bailee, tenant, and borrower, all three are considered trustworthy in a particular concrete property and are 
obliged to return it to the object’s owner. This type of commitment, despite belonging to a concrete 
object, is sometimes called ma fih al-dhamma (something in which dhimma is) (Hosseini Ameli, nd: 133). 
 
2-2- The difference between dhimma and similar concepts 
Since dhimma is one of the important sub-categories of the issue of obligations in jurisprudence, 
it has a close relationship with terms such as covenant, obligation, capacity (ahlīyat), debt, etc., both in 
words and in terms; but they do not have the same application, and the premise of the existence of 
dhimma is preceded on them, especially some have considered the two terms of capacity and liability as 
the same dhimma. So in order to better understand the dhimmah, a brief difference between dhimma and 
other similar concepts are intended here. 
 
2-3-The difference between dhimma and capacity 
In jurisprudential texts, especially Sunni jurisprudential books, sometimes capacity is mistaken 
with dhimma. They consider dhimma as the same as capacity (Faraqi, nd, 3: 226). Capacity 
terminologically means competence and qualification (Ibn Manẓūr, 2004, 1: 327), and technically, it is 
the competence to have rights and duties (Safayi and Qasemzadeh, 2005: 153). Capacity is different from 
dhimma, which should not be taken as the same meaning of dhimma. The capacities of acquire rights and 
obtain rights are the person's competence in rights or enduring duties (Emami, 2003, 1: 203 and 
Katouzian, 1992, 2: 2)3. That is why the common term in the law of the Arab countries, “the capacity of 
acquire rights or capacity of enjoying,” is superior and better to the capacity of obtain rights, which is 
common in Iranian law (Al-Sanhouri, nd, 1: 266). The capacity to enforce or perform rights, or the 
capacity to possessing in Arab rights, commonly referred to as the capacity of exercise rights, means the 
competence and ability of a person to enforce the rights granted to him or her by law (Katouzian, 1992: 
107 and Abdolmajid Bakr, 1989: 15). Thus, it becomes clear that capacity is a sign and effect of the 
existence of dhimma in a person. Capacity however is conceptually different from dhimma. If capacity 
means legal competence and qualification, dhimma refers to the place of establishment (Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 1404 AH, 21: 276). Therefore, capacity, especially the capacity of 
obtain rights, is due to the existence of dhimma, that is, dhimma is necessary for the capacity of acquire 
rights and not its same meaning. This capacity is not proved except after the obligation of dhimma, so that 
it is said: “this is proven in someone’s dhimma” and it is not said: “in someone’s capacity” (Zarqa, 1418 
AH, 2: 1977). According to the author, first and foremost, the tasks required place of implementation. It 
                                                          
3. Article 956 of Civil Law. 
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makes sense to assume a valid place for the human’s security and full observing his character. Secondly 
and broadly, and because of the apparent similarities, dhimma is also considered in the next place to 
establish rights, as it is now possible to consider dhimma as the gathering place of duties and rights. The 
common mistake that must be avoided is the confusion of the container and the object. Sometimes, 
instead of owner of ma fi al-dhamma, it is said owner of the dhimma, while no one can become the owner 
of his dhimma or anyone else’s. For dhimma, unlike ma fi al-dhamma, cannot be possessed.4 As 
mentioned, the difference between dhimma and ma fi al-dhimma is the difference between a container and 
an object. Anyone who wants to drink water or contents in the container never eat the bowl. In the same 
way, the phrase “fulfilling dhimma” is not correct, rather it should be said: “fulfilling what belongs to 
dhimma.” It worth saying that sometimes, the dhimma can be used virtually instead of ma fi al-dhamma. 
In the case of “tasarum al-dhimam”, instead of “tasarum ma fi-dhimam”, it is said “tasarum al-dhimam”, 
that this is the basis of virtual use, and of course the legal sound sense does not prefer the virtual to the 
truth. 
 
2-4-The difference between dhimma and liability 
In cases where there is no material and objective basis for the financial effects of the contract, 
jurists have invented the concept of liability as a container for a person's property and a manifestation of 
the effects of the contract (Shahidi, 2001: 114). Liability is a kind of obligation and it has been used in the 
meaning of fidelity, trust, guarantee, covenant, etc. (Ibn Athīr, 1364 AH: 375). The search in the 
jurisprudential books shows that the majority of scholars have the same meaning and application of these 
two terms, so that they have set these two for conventional matters. Considering dhimma and liability, 
some jurists say that dhimma and liability of each person are the conventions of the Sharia'h or the wise 
towards them. They hence have considered the meaning of the dhimma and liability as the world of 
convention which is the very conventions (Mousavi Bojnordi, 1419 AH, 5: 58). Also, a group of great 
jurists with the same definition of dhimma and liability (i.e. dhimma and liability are a reservoir and a 
warehouse for valid affairs), believe that there is no obstacle to placing one's convention on the covenant, 
which is the case in dhimma (Imam Khomeini, 1421, 1: 379). Therefore, in the view of this great scholar, 
the equality between dhimma and liability is taken into account. This belief also exists among jurists, as 
some professors believe that the literal and technical meaning of liability is commitment and obligation, 
that this can be carried out for dhimma as well (Jafari Langaroudi, 2014: 218-220). Therefore, it has been 
stated that there is no doubt that dhimma terminologically is synonymous with commitment and covenant, 
and it does not matter whether it is general or partial. Or some have interpreted Article 291 of the Civil 
Code (as death is not of the abortive of liability, so after the death, the deceased's debts or the actions 
assigned to them as liability are done from the estate of the deceased). The jurists are divided into two 
groups regarding to dhimma; a group who used the same literal meaning without interfering with 
jurisprudence, and another group who, without any study or source, implicitly assigned the dhimma to the 
obligations in which promisee is general. But what is inferred from the words of the jurists is, firstly, that 
the dhimma and liability do not mean mere commitment, but they are used as a container. Secondly, the 
difference between dhimma and the covenant is not only in the general or partial nature of the contained, 
i.e. the promisee, but the promisee of dhimma and liability is different in nature. Hence, dhimma is the 
container of religion, which is a conditional ruling, but the liability is a container for the obligatory ruling 
(Nematollahi, 2012: 166). Therefore, it can be said that the words dhimma and liability in the religious 
usages, are not the religious truth. 
 
 
                                                          
4. For instance, in a place, instead of “بلط و همذلا یفام داحتا راثآ” it is said “بلطو همذ داحتا راثآ”. See: Katouzian, 1374 HS, n. 276: p. 
406.  
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2-5. Characteristics of Dhimma 
Through studying the jurisprudential rules and considering the various uses that have been 
applied to dhimma, the following characteristics can be considered for dhimma: 
A) Dhimma is a conventional container that is assumed for individuals. Therefore, the fetus has no 
dhimma before the birth (Mirzay-e Qomi, 1992, 4: 356). Similarly, the existence of dhimma for animals is 
not acceptable. Therefore, if a person makes a will for the benefit of an animal, if his intention is to 
possess something, that is, to conclude a proprietary will, in the same way that the bequest enters the 
ownership of the animal, the will would be void. For the animal has no dhimma to possess something. But 
if his intention is to advise others to donate to the animal, it is okay. Of course, today in law, because 
legal entities are also considered for commercial institutions and companies, such personalities are also 
having dhimma according to the validity of the law as real persons. 
B) Each person has a dhimma and it is not possible to consider several dhimma for a person, just as 
several people cannot share in a single dhimma (Bojnordi and Moqtadayi, 2013: 2). Since the dhimma has 
a conventional place in the person, it has the capacity of positive and negative components without 
limitation. That is why a person can have extraordinary debts with positive components and extraordinary 
assets, without any problem in his dhimma. 
C) Every person has a dhimma after birth, even if he has no debt, for the dhimma is attached to the person 
himself. Every human being has the ability to tamannu'. Therefore, a person cannot be considered without 
the ability to have or commit. Therefore, even a child who has just been born and has no property, and no 
one has made a will or inherited for him, still has a dhimma (Khansari, 1999, 1: 145). However, some 
have considered puberty as a condition for dhimma (Shahid Thani, 1409 AH: 225). It seems that dhimma, 
albeit weakly, arises only for possession and use incompletely from the time of pregnancy, but it is a 
shaky existence that is established with the birth. In the case of legal entities, it can be considered as 
dhimma after its formation and establishment. 
D) Dhimma is a place for all debts and no debt is preferable to another one, unless the debtor has taken 
mortgage for his claim and has an objective right, in which case he is superior to the other creditors. Some 
personal rights have also taken precedence in Islamic jurisprudence, such as the cost of equipping and 
burying the deceased, as well as alimony for the wife and children of the person. Therefore, the 
precedence of some debts in terms of their dhimma is not the reason for preferring that debt over the next 
debt. On the other hand, the debts owed to individuals’ dhimma do not bind a particular piece of their 
property. This is contrary to the objective rights of individuals over their property, which constitute a 
specific property. This constitutes the fundamental difference between objective and debt rights. 
E) Dhimma belongs to the person and debt belongs to the dhimma after its creation and thus does not 
impose restrictions on the concrete objects and the components inside the person’s dhimma (Zohayli, 
1409 AH: 53). At the same time, it can be said that in Islamic law, as in French law, the property of 
individuals is the general collateral of creditors. It is not in the sense that they have found an objective 
right over the person’s dhimma to a particular property. Rather, it means that the creditor can take his 
right from the debtor's property. 
F) With the death of a person, his dhimma is also eliminated, for the dhimma is connected to his 
personality. However, there is disagreement on this regard: 
 
1- Although in Imami jurisprudence, there is no clear and explicit discussion about the survival of 
dhimma after the death of individuals, from some Imami narrations and beliefs, even if only occasionally, 
one can see the traces of the survival of dhimma, even after the death of the deceased (Allama Hilli, 1420 
AH: 557). There are some reliable narrations that advise the guarantee for the deceased. The Permission 
to guarantee the deceased's dhimma implicitly refers to the survival of his dhimma. As an example, in a 
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narration, Abi Saeed Khedri narrates that he said, “We were with the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) in front 
of a corpse. He said: ‘dose the deceased have debt?’ They replied: ‘yes, two dirhams are owed’, He said: 
‘do yourself pray for the body.’ Ali (AS) said: ‘O Messenger of Allah (PBUH), I took over those two 
dirhams. I am his guarantor and I will pay the two dirhams.’ Then the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) stood 
up and prayed over the corpse. He then turned to Ali (AS) and said: ‘May God reward you with goodness 
and release your dhimma, just as you released your brother's dhimma.’”5 This shows that in Islam, there is 
guarantee for the dhimma of a debtor deceased and it is correct and effective (Sheikh Tusi, nd: 1309 and 
Mohaghegh Hilli, 1413 AH, 13: 348). 
2. The Sunnis generally (Maliki and Shafi'i and some Hanbalis) believe that after the death of a person, 
the dhimma will remain until the liquidation of the rights belonging to the estate, and after the liquidation, 
the dhimma of the deceased will end; Therefore, the dead can even find new rights after his death. Sunni 
jurists usually cite a narration from the Prophet (PBUH) according to which “the soul of a believer 
depends on his debt until it is payed” (Al-Abi Al-Azhari, 1421 AH: 317).6 
3- According to some Hanafis, the death of the deceased does not cause the decline of dhimma, but 
weakens it. In this view, the dhimma remains only necessary to settle the creditors' rights (Malik Ibn 
'Anas, 1323, 2: 148). On the contrary, Abu Yusuf believes that if a will is made for the living and the 
dead, the will is valid for the living and not for the dead, for the deceased does not have the power of 
making will (Al-Kasani Al-Hanafi, 1420 AH: 9). In short, according to Hanafi, with death, the dhimma is 
neither disappeared nor remains, rather, it is destroyed. 
4. Maliki and some Hanbalis believe that a person’s dhimma is destroyed by death. If the deceased has 
left property, the debt will belong to that property, otherwise the debt will be waived. For there is no place 
to settle the debt yet (Sanhouri, 1988: 18). 
 
3-  Assets 
 
In Arabic law, following the French law, the title property is used instead of dhimma; jurists have 
used these two terms together shoulder to shoulder, as some professors have quote it in the definition of 
debt or ma fi al-dhimma: “...Claim and the like that belong to the container of property or dhimma of a 
person, whether real or legal (Jafari Langaroudi, 1998: 483).” In this section, the concept of asset 
(property) in law is first examined. Then we will compare the concept of asset with dhimma. 
 
3-1. The concept of asset 
Property, in the sense of possessing and having, is the term against “Patrimoine”, refering to the 
sum of property, claims, and debts. Therefore, in legal terminology, asset includes the dual sum of the 
positive and negative components of human property (Langaroudi, 2012: 280). The French word 
“Patrimoine” is derived from the Latin principle “Patrimonium”. The word is structurally similar to words 
such as “Matrimonium” derived from “Regime Matrimonial” in modern French. The concept of principle 
meaning the origin and also the concept of authority7 in this type of vocabulary are intended here. That’s 
why the heritage of father is called “Patrimoine.” Because the legacy left by the father or grandfather is 
based on their authority. Similarly, “Patrimoine moral” or moral asset, which includes a set of rules left 
                                                          
5. Under the narration is mentioned: کیخا ناهر تککف امك کناهر کفو اریخ ملاسلاا نع الله کازج, in which the word ناهر is used for 
dhimma. (see: Hurr ‘Amili, Muhammad bin Al-Hassan, Ibid, 18: 424). 
6. »هنع يضقت ىتح هنيدب ةقلعم نموملا سفن« (see: Al-Albani, 1408 AH: 313, h. 860-861). 
7. Auctoritas. 
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by ancestors and has a moral strategy, is used as well8 (Robert, 1971: 178). The term “Patrimoine” in 
legal usage usually refers to the elements of wealth and individual’s richness. In this application, the 
property includes the property of persons, whether living or non-living, movable and immovable, material 
or immaterial. The term “Biens patrimoniaux” stands against “Biens extrapatrimoniaux”. The latter is 
related to the things that the human person possesses, whether in the physical realm of man, such as life, 
material health, etc., or the spiritual, such as honor, fame, peace, and... (Flour (J), 2002: 55). 
Therefore, the boundary between non-financial assets and financial assets is separate. However, it 
is sometimes seen in the statements of the French courts that the concept of “Patrimoine” has gone 
beyond its own meaning. As an example, the criminal branch of the Supreme Court of France on May 24, 
1860, considered the memory of the deceased to be part of his family's property. But in a special sense, 
the legal doctrine today deals with the above-mentioned word exclusively in terms of economic 
components, and in contrast, matters concerning the human body or the human soul are non-financial 
matters, and the term “extrapatrimoniaux” is used to describe them (Nerson, 1939: 1). Therefore, it can be 
said that every person has a conventional vessel called asset/property. The set of rights and duties of the 
persons constitute the asset. The positive and negative components, i.e. the assets of the individuals, are 
assumed within this conventional container. They are interacting with each other, and neither is 
independent of the other. 
 
3-2. Features of Asset 
A. According to low, property is necessary for human personality. Therefore, every person necessarily 
has an asset, even if the positive component of the asset is very small. Also, each person can have only 
one asset, which means that just as a person's personality cannot be decomposed, his asset is also 
independent, although a person can leave a portion of his or her assets to the bank for the purchase of real 
properties. 
B. The set of assets of a person provides him with a respectable and necessary realm of territory, which, 
both in terms of reduction and addition to that component, in the authorized cases, requires his acceptance 
or at least his consent. 
C. Assets are the manifestation of a person's personality and legal authority, and in this regard, the 
followings are mentioned: 
1. We can never imagine a character without possessions, even a newborn baby and an old man whose 
death has not been confirmed by forensic medicine. 
2- From the beginning of the baby's life, he has assets because the child has the ability to enjoy it by 
achieving the ability to resign. 
3. Each person has an asset (the principle of unity and the indivisibility of the asset). Otherwise, creditors 
cannot have collateral right for the debtor's property, which is contrary to the principle of unity. 
4- Assets are not separated from the personality in any way except by the death of the personality after 
when his assets are transferred to the heirs. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8. Terme le plus général par lequel l’on désigne tout ce qui existe et qui est concevable comme un object unique (concret, 
abstrait),V.Rey (A) et Rey-Debove(J) et cottez(H), (Sous la direction de Paul Robert). 
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding (IJMMU) Vol. 7, No. 7, August 2020 
 
Comparison of Dhimmah and Asset in French Jurisprudence and Law 136 
 
3-3. Applications of Asset 
According to what has been said, the asset in one of its applications includes valuable foreign 
elements that people have in their possession. This economic view of the concept of asset is also seen in 
the various regulations. That's often the case when it comes to people's assets. 
For example, Article 1844-4 of the French Civil Code stipulate that: “a company may transfer its 
assets.” Either Article 1844-5 of the Civil Code speaks of the transfer of property, or Article 878 of the 
French Civil Code discusses the transfer of an individual’s property. The article states that “estate’s 
creditors may apply for the division of the deceased’s property by inheritance.” The word “Patrimoine” is 
used in the same sense in Article 272 of the Civil Code. As seen, in this application, it refers to the 
components of the asset. Beside economic and exchangeable components, jurists have coined other uses, 
such as “the property of the nation” or “the general property of humanity,” which includes many 
elements, real and artistic. Through its full connection to the wealth of a nation or human beings, they 
may be considered the owner of that wealth (Weill, 1979: 57). As for the other use of the word, the asset 
is sometimes used to mean all property. In this application, numerical items and asset’s components are 
not regarded. An asset can have an infinite quantity and only contain one item of property. The question 
is, may it be imagined that there is no element in the asset, in the sense that the asset has no component? 
The answer is that there is no limitation. In a situation where the asset is the person’s current or future 
asset set, it may be assumed that the person has that set, but no element is found inside it.9 In the classic 
French theory, explained and clarified by Aubry et Rau in their famous work “Cours de droit civil”, there 
is an inseparable link between character and wealth. In this theory, an asset refers to the sum of one’s 
rights and obligations, not to its components. This theory has three main conclusions: 
(A) Only persons, whether legal or real, may have assets. Neither property exists independently, nor may 
a person be found without it, for in this theory, asset means the ability to create rights and financial 
obligations. 
B) Each person has only one asset. Asset is also divided to unitary and indivisible, based on the 
personality. No one can divide his asset into several parts. Rather, the person with all his assets is placed 
in front of the creditors. 
C) Asset during the lifetime of a person, whether legal or real, is non-transferable to others. What is 
passed on to others is only the components of the asset. Because no one can transfer power and authority 
to another. According to French writers, with death, the property is transferred to the heirs (Colin et 
Capitan, 1953: 61). 
As for the principle of unity of asset, it should be added that some laws such as German, British 
and American laws have considered the desired unity in certain activities, according to which the asset of 
individuals in those special activities is allocated and separated from their general assets. This theory is 
called asset allocation theory. French law has not denied this either (Weill, 1979: 57). 
In some French views, endowments are described as “the collective allocation of property for a 
specific purpose.”10 In some French regulations, the endowment is described as “the irreversible 
allocation of property or rights to the performance of a public benefit activity without the intention of 
making a profit.”11 One partner limited liability companies are, in fact, formed by a real or legal person 
through the collective allocation of property to a specific economic or agricultural activity. In the same 
cases, which follow the theory of asset allocation theory, it is seen that by creating another legal entity, 
individuals have given a part of their assets to that entity, and thus we are dealing with two or more 
individuals with separate assets. In this sense, there is no critique of classical theory. In other words, the 
                                                          
9. Seriaux, op. cit. n˚4, p. 2. 
10. 2.Cass 1 civ. 15fev. 1983. bull. Civ.I, n61, cité par seriaux, op. cit. n°4, p.2. 
11. L.n87- 571 du 23 juill. 1987 art.18 al.l 
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legislature’s purpose of authorizing one partner companies was that traders or farmers allocate a part of 
their property to professional activities. 
In order to separate a part of the property from other properties and also in order to keep other 
assets away from the pursuit of creditors who claimed the debtor through his professional activities, there 
are two solutions; The first: traders and farmers can divide their assets into several separate assets. The 
second: recourse is to the concept of legal personality, such that these persons can establish a company 
and be the only partner of that company. The second solution has the advantage of maintaining its affinity 
with public law. Moreover, it is in line with the principle of the unity of one’s property (Colin, 1928: 63). 
Although this solution has preserved the rules related to property, it has created an amazing phenomenon;   
As a company is formed with only a single partner and has only one member. That is why the 
chosen solution requires a change in the concept of the company. The first paragraph of Article 1832 of 
the French Civil Code provides for the establishment of a company with two or more partners. However, 
the second paragraph of Article 1833 of the same law states that in some cases, it is possible to establish a 
company with a single member. This authorization is also prescribed in the second paragraph of Article 
1832. It is proved then that in French law, the establishment of a sole proprietorship company is an 
exception to the rule and is not permitted, save in cases permitted by law. 
As for the unity of property and as a violation it may be said that how can it be accepted that a 
poor person has property? The fact is that this poor person is at least the owner of his own clothes, 
otherwise his assumption of ownership of the property will not be ruled out. Asset components should not 
be confused with asset. Assets are created for individuals as a result of the ability to enjoy (tamattu'). 
In our day, the general ability to enjoy, which is the possession of property unlimitedly and the 
utilization of it, has been known to human beings from the time of sperm fertilization until their death. 
Today, there are no longer slavery companies or conditions in which a woman was deprived of 
her rights through marriage. Civil death has been also stopped since 1854 (Mazeaud, 1985: 27). As for the 
fetus whose sperm has been coagulated, although not born, an old legal presumption that is now in the 
ranks of the general rules of law for the fetus, according to the rulings of the courts, has also considered 
the ability to enjoy inheritance even for fetus.12 
Article 906 of the French Civil Code stipulates: “... In order to have gratuitous possession 
between lives, the coagulation of sperm at the time of donation is sufficient, and also for the possession 
through a will, the coagulation of the legatee is sufficient at the time of the legator's death. However, the 
gift and the will would not be effective unless the child is born alive.” Legal entities, in general, have the 
capacity to enjoy based on their expertise. Only in exceptional and special cases do these people lose their 
ability. For example, incompetence due to criminal convictions or legal restrictions due to uncertainty 
about the activities of a legal entity are such, and except in these cases, legal competence as a result of the 
existence of assets for legal entities is also in accordance with the rule. In French law, the authors provide 
other examples of criticism of classical theory. The reference to inheritance rules includes in such cases 
(Sanhouri, 1988, 1: 217). The reason for this criticism is the acceptance of the optional inheritance from 
1804 by the French regulations. The most obvious result of these regulations is that the heir, on the one 
hand, is the owner of his own personal property and, on the other, the owner of the property left from the 
deceased as his estate. These two assets are separate from each other until the payment is made to all the 
creditors of the estate by the property that previously belonged to the deceased and henceforth belongs to 
the heir. Similarly, creditors of inheritance can separate the estate from the pursuit of the heirs’ personal 
creditors by segregating or dividing the property (Terré, 2002: 158). Article 878 of the Civil Code 
provides: “Creditors in any circumstances and against any claim may sue for the division of the 
deceased's property from the heir's property.” In this article, “each creditor” means the personal creditors 
                                                          
12. Cass.l civ, 10 dec. 1985, Bull. civ.I. n°339, cité par seriaux, op. cit. n˚5, p.3. 
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of the heir.13 The non-transferability of a part of a person’s property in accordance with the legal and 
authorized conditions accepted by the French judicial procedure14, or the non-seizure of property that is to 
remain in the holder’s possession, or a case arising from the right of return provided by law, all may 
impair the integrity of the entity’s assets. For example, in the latter case one may refer to Articles 368-1 
of the French Civil Code, in which stipulates about the inheritance of an adopted child that if he has no 
descending relatives, the property received from the guardian must be returned to the guardian or heirs of 
the guardian. 
As it is clear from the above examples, sometimes dichotomy in asset is complete and sometimes 
imperfect. In the first hypothesis for the accumulation of the heir’s assets alongside the deceased’s 
property before the settlement of the estate, the dichotomy is complete. But in other assumptions, 
dichotomy is observed, albeit incompletely. For in all these cases, the property or a set of property is 
subject to regulations that more or less create an independent set inside the assets. This dichotomy is 
referred to in French legal literature as “dichotomy while a single mass.”15 16 
3-4- Comparison of dhimma in Islamic jurisprudence with assets in classical law 
Although dhimma in Islamic law is very similar to the concept of property in French law, a 
comparison of the two concepts shows differences that are examined below. 
A) In classical French theory, at the beginning of this theory, property included exclusively the financial 
rights of individuals over concrete objects. In other words, a person’s asset was a set of assets on which a 
person had an objective right. Thus, the debt rights of individuals were not considered his property. Later, 
jurists, in order to create harmony between debt and objective rights in this regard, widely assumed debts 
that a person were obliged to perform as included in his property (Planiol, 1952: 15).17In one of his 
writings, Mazeaud states: “The debtor commits to a normal obligation with all his property, which 
simultaneously includes debt and obligation...” (Mazeaud, 1985: 73)18. While some classical French 
jurists with an analysis based on the text, in the Article 2092 of the French Civil Code does not infer that 
debt is to be an asset. The article stipulates that “anyone who is personally liable is required to fulfill his 
obligation through all his movable and immovable property as well as his present and future asset.” As 
seen, this article is related to a person’s positive asset. This doctrine was however disputed (Sériaux, 
1992: 3). Some regulations also tend to summarize the concept of asset exclusively in a person’s 
inventory, both in principle and in causerie. For example, Article 272 of the French Civil Code, after 
referring to the word “Patrimoine” and as an explanation, refers only to the principle and causeries and 
the positive elements of the asset. On the contrary, in Islamic law and according to popular opinion, it 
belongs to all general objectives. Therefore, as a rule, general claims and general debts are assigned to 
individuals’ dhimma. That is why it is not correct to discharge the concrete objects. For it is the subject of 
ma fi al-dhimma (Shahidi Thani, 1398, 4: 357). Hence, if in the lease contract, the lessee has leased the 
property benefits for ten million Rials for a period of one year, the landlord can discharge the tenant’s 
dhimma (lien) to it. However, the lessee cannot discharge the lessor’s dhimma to the beneficiary. But, he 
can waive his objective right to property. 
(B) In classical and ancient Roman law, the obligation was a personal relationship between a debtor and a 
creditor, and it was not possible to transfer it from both the debtor or the creditor. Because every creditor 
has a special manner, such as stubbornness or negligence. Just as each debtor has a certain morality, such 
as being loyal to his promises. Each of these attributes plays an important role in the value of debt 
                                                          
13. Civ. 15juill 1891. Cité par seriaux, op. cit. n˚6, p.3. 
14. Cass 1er civ. octobre.1985, Bull.civ.I.n°252. cité par seriaux op. cit. n˚6, p.3. 
15. To refer to this dichotomy in French legal texts, the phrase “Dualisme larve” is used. We preferred to use “dichotomy while a 
single mass” instead of its translation. 
16. Seriaux, op. cit, n˚6, p. 3. 
17. Planiol et Ripert, Traité pratique de droit civil français, t.3, Les biens, 1952, LGDJ, n˚15. 
18. Le débiteur d’une obligation ordinaire est tenu sur tout son patrimoine qui supporte à la fois la schuld (dette) et la Haftung 
(contrainte) v. mazeaud, op. cit. n˚9, p. 12. 
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(Tavakoli Kermani, 2001: 19). For this reason, in the traditional Roman view, instead of transferring debt 
or claim, it was to change it to a commitment, and then in this view, the main commitment with all its 
features would disappear and another commitment would be made instead. These ideas were later 
modified in France, but some of its effects remained. At the same time, classical French writers allowed 
also the forcible (legal) transfer of debt through inheritance. According to classical professors, the 
container of property in which the rights and financial obligations of the deceased are accumulated, 
remains after his death. But it is impossible to remain this vessel without connecting it to the person. 
Therefore, the property is inevitably attributed to the deceased’s heir as his successor. That is why it is 
said in French law that the heir is the successor of the deceased’s character. According to this theory, by 
the death, the dead's rights and debts are transferred to the heir immediately. Of course, the heir, 
especially if the deceased's debt is more than the positive rights and components of his property, can 
reject the estate, or, provided that they observe all estates and estimate their amount to debts, accept it. 
Article 774 of the French Civil Code stipulates: “Inheritance may be accepted unconditionally or simply, 
or provided that it is taken into account and its measurement is estimated in relation to debt.”19 In the 
latter case, the heir are responsible for the debt of the inheritance only for the amount of the positive 
components of the will. Thus, in French law, the death of a person will end his dhimma as well, though all 
his property and debts are transferred to the heir. However, in Islamic jurisprudence, there is no consensus 
on the time of the end of dhimma, as mentioned before. Although some have commented on the end of 
dhimma, many Sunni writers believe that dhimma will remain even after his death (Malik Ibn Anas, 1323 
AH, 2: 148 and Mohaghegh Hilli, 1413 AH, 13: 348). There are some Imami authentic narrations such as 
Al-Za'im Gharim’s in order to prove this theory. Thus in Islamic law, the acquittal of the debtor 
deceased’s dhimma is allowed and accepted (Sheikh Tusi, nd: 309 and Ibn Idrīs, 1410 AH, 2: 53). 
C) In classical French law, following Roman law, by the death, not only the dead’s property and financial 
rights became the property of the heir, but also all his debts and obligations were transferred to the heir. 
The heir had to pay the deceased’s debts from the estate and in case of lack of property or insufficiency of 
the estate, they were responsible to pay the dead’s debts themselves. But in Islamic law, the heirs only 
own the deceased’s property, for the deceased’s character ends with his death. Thus, with the death of the 
deceased, the estate is recognized as the guarantor for the creditors’ claims, without changing the debt 
right into the main objective right in the estate. 
D) In classical French law, an asset consists only of a set of individual financial rights and obligations, as 
well as whatever has financial value. Thus, the political rights of individuals or the rights placed in the 
human rights framework, such as the right to life and liberty and the like, are not related to property. 
Lawsuits related to the civil status of individuals, such as marital or lineage claims and the like, though 
they may have financial effects, are not themselves considered as personal assets and are not included in a 
person’s property. Therefore, all the concrete objective rights of individuals, whether original or 
subordinate such as ownership, right of easement, exploitation, mortgage, and the like, as well as debt 
rights, are within the property of individuals. Similarly, the financial aspects of the rights to literary and 
artistic property are within the property, in contrast to non-financial aspects. In other side, the content of 
dhimma in Islamic jurisprudence is different; Islamic jurisprudence is not limited to the financial rights of 
individuals, and other rights and duties, even non-financial, are established in their dhimma. Some Islamic 
duties and obligations that have no financial aspect, such as prayer, fasting, Hajj, and the like, are in the 
dhimma of individuals. That is why sometimes it is said that someone has few months or prayers on his 
dhimma. Similarly, some of the duties and acts of worship that have financial aspects, such as khums (one 
fifth of property), zakat (alms-giving), fitriyah or fitrah (alms-giving in the fitr feast), and the like, are 
also included in the dhimma (Montazari, 1415 AH, 1: 105). Therefore, the scope of the dhimma in Islamic 
law is more widely than Western law. Instead, the concept of asset in current French law includes all 
financial rights. 
                                                          
19. Art.774: Une succession peut être acceptée purement et simplement ousous bénéfice d’inventaire. 
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E) Some writers of Islamic law discuss the destruction of dhimma or even the occurrence of defects on it. 
As mentioned above, according to Shafi'i, after the death, the deceased’s dhimma neither disappears nor 
remains as he did during his lifetime. Rather, it is destroyed (Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, 1424 AH: 311). 
Some have also said about the bill of exchange: Whenever the bill is established to the indebted (mashqul 
al-dhimma) and after the contract it becomes clear that he was insolvent, the creditor (muhtal) has the 
right to cancel it. Because the dhimma of the drawee (mahalun alayh) is defective due to his insolvency. 
This option is actually a redhibition.20 Although the occurrence of a defect on dhimma or its destruction 
has been less specified and such interpretations have not been prevalent, it can indicate the jurists’ 
different perception of the concept of dhimma. This statement, along with other views such as the 
continuance of dhimma even after the death of its owner, indicates bestowing a legal personality, even if 
incomplete, to the dhimma. In French law, on the other hand, property is generally considered to be a set 
of property whose elements and components have become an indivisible whole. That is why attributing 
features such as defect and destruction to property is impossible in French law (Sanhouri, 1998: 19). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Dhimma is closely related to terms such as covenant, commitment, obligation, guarantee, debt, 
capacity, etc., and in the sense of jurisprudence and law, it is the very covenant, taking all the 
requirements and obligations. So some jurists and Islamic jurisprudents considered the dhimma as 
synonymous to above terms, especially liability and capacity. However, liability and dhimma respectively 
are as the same as imperative and positive rules, in opposition to each other. The relation between them is 
generality and peculiarity in some respect. Also, the assumption of the existence of dhimma is prior to all 
other terms. Every person has an objective vessel called asset, so it requires the human personality and the 
set of rights and duties of the individuals constitutes the asset. The positive and negative components, i.e. 
the components of individuals’ assets are assumed to be within this objective vessel. Comparing the 
concept of dhimma in Islamic law, which is often considered a container of generalities and religious law, 
with the concept of asset in French law, which is rooted in Roman law, shows significant differences. 
Among the differences is that in the asset theory and at the beginning of its advent, the asset exclusively 
included the financial rights of individuals over concrete objective properties. Lawyers later explicitly 
assumed that the obligations of a person were within the person’s property, so they can establish harmony 
between objective and debt rights in this regard. However, according to popular opinion, save in 
exceptional cases, the dhimma is considered exclusively a general container. 
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